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OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.
Appellant Keith Jones, who is currently incarcerated at
New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, filed this complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for
violation of his constitutional rights.

Jones named as

defendants six employees of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.

The gravamen of Jones's claim is that his right to

due process was denied in connection with a prison disciplinary
charge for which he was originally adjudged guilty and served
time in detention before it was reversed.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
The disciplinary charge was based on the following
facts:

On August 20, 1991, Senior Corrections Officer Marren of

the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton found a letter that stated
that "Twin, Malik and myself is [sic] waiting on those things
(fiber Joints (shank) . . ."

App. at 40.

Prison officials

determined that "Twin" referred to appellant Jones.

Based on

this letter, Jones was charged with attempting to possess a
weapon.

On August 21, 1991, Jones was removed from the

mainstream prison population and placed in what the district
court referred to as the "hole" pending a hearing.
On August 28, 1991, defendant Gary Sheppard, a hearing
officer, conducted an administrative hearing in which this letter
and a confidential report constituted the evidence against Jones,
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and at which Jones was found guilty of attempting to possess
weapons.

As a result of the administrative ruling, Jones was

placed in detention for fifteen days, and it was recommended that
he lose 180 days commutation credits and that he be subjected to
180 days of administrative segregation.

Jones appealed this

decision through administrative channels.

On September 9, 1991,

defendant Vernon Johnson, the Assistant Superintendent, upheld
the decision of Hearing Officer Sheppard.

Jones sought

reconsideration of this decision, which was denied by
Superintendent Howard Beyer on September 16, 1991.
Jones then appealed to the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division.

In an opinion dated July 14, 1993,

that court reversed the decision of the prison officials and
vacated the sanctions imposed on Jones, finding that the decision
was not based on substantial evidence.

The Appellate Division

court found the confidential report to lack probative value and
characterized the evidence against Jones "as superficial at
best."

Jones v. Department of Corrections, No. A-3121-91T5 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 1993) (per curiam) at 2, reprinted
in App. at 41.
Jones then filed this action in federal court.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds.

First they

argued that Jones's complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations, using as the filing date the official filing which
followed the court's evaluation of Jones's in forma pauperis
application, rather than the date on which the complaint was
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received.

Second, the defendants interposed a res judicata

defense.
The district court rejected defendants' argument that
the suit was time barred, finding that the relevant date for
statute of limitations purposes was the date of receipt of
Jones's complaint.

However, the district court granted

defendants' motion for summary judgment, agreeing that Jones's
action was barred by application of the doctrine of res judicata
and New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine.

The court reasoned

that the judgment in the New Jersey state case was final, had
been adjudicated on the merits, and involved the same parties and
the same occurrence or transaction.

As a result, Jones was

barred from raising any claims which he could have raised in the
first action.

The court determined that Jones could have raised

the section 1983 claim asserted here in the New Jersey state
court proceeding, and thus found this action to be barred.
Jones filed a timely pro se appeal to this court.
II.
Discussion1
Federal courts must apply the doctrine of res judicata
to civil actions brought under section 1983 and in this context
"must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect
as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in
which the judgment was rendered."

1

Migra v. Warren City School

Defendants do not raise the statute of limitations issue on
appeal, and thus we confine ourselves to the res judicata/entire
controversy issue.
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Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).

The principles of res

judicata are reinforced in New Jersey by the entire controversy
doctrine which "requires that all issues of a single dispute
between the parties must be completely determined in one action."
Culver v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 559 A.2d 400, 406 (N.J. 1989).
Under New Jersey law, res judicata or claim preclusion
applies when (1) the judgment in the first action is valid, final
and on the merits; (2) there is identity of the parties, or the
parties in the second action are in privity with those in the
first action; and (3) the claim in the later action grows out of
the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the first
action.

See Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591

A.2d 592, 599 (N.J. 1991); Culver, 559 A.2d at 405-06.
It is evident that the first condition for application
of res judicata has been met in that the Appellate Division
decision was final, valid and on the merits.

In addition, it

appears that the employees of the Department of Corrections, who
are the defendants in this action, may be considered to be the
same or in privity with the Department of Corrections, which was
the defendant in the first action, and may claim the benefit of
res judicata if it would apply to the Department itself.

See

Rodziewicz v. Beyer, 809 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (D.N.J. 1992)
(employees of Department of Corrections held to be in identity
with the Department for claim preclusion under New Jersey law).
Moreover, the entire controversy doctrine is applicable not only
to related claims but also to related parties.

See Cogdell v.

Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178 (N.J. 1989).
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Nonetheless, we do not decide whether the second prong of res
judicata has been met in this case, nor do we decide whether the
third prong, which requires that the claim in the second action
grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in
the state court action, applies here.

The New Jersey Supreme

Court has directed courts to consider:
(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for
relief are the same (that is, whether the wrong for
which redress is sought is the same in both actions);
(2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3)
whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial
are the same (that is, whether the same evidence
necessary to maintain the second action would support
the first); and (4) whether the material facts alleged
are the same.
Culver, 559 A.2d at 406 (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)).

The

district court applied the criteria set forth in Culver and
concluded that Jones's federal action involved the same
transaction or occurrence as at issue in the earlier New Jersey
Superior Court action.
We believe that a persuasive argument can be made that
neither the acts complained of nor the demand for relief in the
two actions are the same.

In the first action, Jones challenged

the administrative determination of his guilt on the attempted
possession of weapons charge; thus the acts at issue in that case
were those of Jones.

By contrast, in the federal action, Jones

challenges the conduct of the Department of Corrections'
officials in proceeding with the disciplinary hearing and
sanctions "knowing they had no just cause."

App. at 7.

Although

the district court was correct that whether plaintiff's right to
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due process was violated will be implicated in both cases, there
are differences, albeit subtle, between the two actions.

Because

we believe another issue is dispositive, for our purposes we will
assume that the district court did not err in finding the
similarity requisite for application of res judicata.
Instead, we part with the district court in its
determination that the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate
Division would have heard Jones's section 1983 claim as part of
its review over the prison disciplinary action, had Jones
presented it at that time.
It is unquestioned that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts to hear section 1983 claims. See
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).

However, under the

entire controversy doctrine, a party will not be barred from
raising claims that he could not have brought in the initial
action.

As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, if
the court in the first action would clearly not have
had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or
ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have
declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion),
then a second action in a competent court presenting
the omitted theory or ground should not be held
precluded.

Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 25 cmt. e (1982)); see also Culver, 559 A.2d at 406.
Thus, to invoke the principles of res judicata, the first court
must not only have had jurisdiction to hear the claim now sought
to be precluded, but there must also be some likelihood that it
would have exercised that jurisdiction to hear that claim.
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Under New Jersey Rules of Appellate Practice 2:2-3(2),
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction
over appeals from administrative agencies.

New Jersey Rule of

Appellate Practice 2:10-5 provides that "[t]he appellate court
may exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the
complete determination of any matter on review."

This Rule was

relied upon by the district court in its decision that New Jersey
law would not have barred Jones from raising his section 1983
claim at the time he appealed the administrative action to the
Appellate Division.
The New Jersey courts have suggested that under this
Rule the appellate courts have jurisdiction to make factual
findings that ordinarily would be remanded to the trial courts
when this is necessary to the complete determination of disputes
before them.

See, e.g., State v. Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559, 567

(N.J. 1989) ("[W]hen an appellate court finds a clear abuse of
discretion, it has the power to make new fact-findings.

The

power to review evidence and reach independent determinations of
the facts encompasses the power to call for additional evidence
to supplement the record") (citations omitted)); State v.
Rodriguez, 357 A.2d 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (per
curiam) (Appellate Division exercised original jurisdiction to
determine whether there had been manifest denial of justice under
the law, an issue not decided by the Superior Court, but
necessary to completely determine the matter); State v. Odom, 273
A.2d 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (per curiam) (Appellate
Division could make findings of fact justifying denial of post8

conviction relief where trial court had failed to do so rather
than remand).
The leading case applying this Rule in the context of
an appeal of an administrative decision is Pascucci v. Vagott,
362 A.2d 566 (N.J. 1976), where the Supreme Court of New Jersey
construed Rules of Appellate Practice 2:2-3(2) and 2:10-5
together as permitting appellate courts in actions arising under
administrative review to exercise original jurisdiction as to
related matters necessary to the complete resolution of a matter
properly before an appellate court.

In that case, the Court

determined that the Appellate Division, in reviewing a challenge
to a regulation of the Department of Public Welfare which varied
the amount of public assistance paid to employable versus
unemployable persons, could exercise original jurisdiction to
completely resolve the questions raised and decide the claim of
one of the appellants who had argued that the local welfare
director's discretionary authority exceeded that provided by
statute, a claim that ordinarily would be brought in Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.

See id. at 572-73.

The Pascucci court

determined that because the Appellate Division had jurisdiction
over the administrative proceedings, and because under Rule 2:105 it could "exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary
to the complete determination of any matter on review," the
Appellate Division could also hear the challenge that would
otherwise be heard in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
id.
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See

It does not follow from Pascucci that a New Jersey
appellate court would exercise its power of original
jurisdiction--ordinarily reserved for situations in which
judicial efficiency dictates that the appellate court not remand
a case--to resolve claims best heard by a trial court.

The

majority of New Jersey cases applying Rule 2:10-5 represent
instances in which appellate courts, despite the absence of trial
court findings, had an adequate factual basis in the record to
resolve questions that were essential to the determination of the
issues before them.

See, e.g., In re S.H., 293 A.2d 181, 185

(N.J. 1972) (Supreme Court reviewed undisputed evidence of record
only, finding that it established that juvenile had committed the
act with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt); Bruder
v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 142 A.2d 225, 229 (N.J.
1958) (where dispute involved exclusively legal questions
appellate court would invoke power of original jurisdiction based
on undisputed evidence presented to judge who incorrectly
dismissed case for lack of jurisdiction); African Council v.
Hadge, 604 A.2d 604, 609 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("Given
. . . the completeness of the record, the interest of justice
dictates that we exercise original jurisdiction pursuant to R.
2:10-5 in fixing a counsel fee allowance."); Marion v. Manasquan,
555 A.2d 699, 704 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) ("Although
this specific question was not presented to the trial judge, we
raise it now sua sponte since its resolution is necessary for a
complete determination of the matter under review and the facts
to resolve it are present in the record." (emphasis added));
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Young v. Savinon, 492 A.2d 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)
(based on factual testimony and expert opinion presented at
trial, Appellate Division found it unreasonable to enforce a
particular provision in tenants' lease); Ferrari v. Melleby, 342
A.2d 537, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("We have
carefully reviewed the record and are satisfied that appellant's
charges are essentially true as outlined previously, and that in
substance they are not denied by respondents."); but cf. State v.
Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559, 568 (N.J. 1989) (affirming appellate
court's decision to call for additional documentary evidence,
including autopsy report, to supplement the record in limited
context of criminal sentencing).
Although an appellate court reviewing administrative
decisions may invoke Rule 2:10-5, the scope of appellate review
of agency decisions is generally narrow.

See, e.g., T.R. v. New

Jersey Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 592 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (appellate court must not substitute
own judgment for that of agency).
Based on our review of New Jersey cases, we predict
that a New Jersey appellate court faced with Jones's section 1983
claim at the time that it was evaluating his appeal of the
administrative sanctions imposed on him would not exercise
original jurisdiction under Rule 2:10-5.
Our prediction that the New Jersey Appellate Division
court would not have exercised jurisdiction over Jones's section
1983 claim is based in part on the sparsity of his complaint.
states only that the named defendants denied him due process
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He

rights by instigating administrative proceedings against him
knowing that they lacked the requisite just cause.

Analysis of

this claim would have required evidence not of record at the time
of the appeal of the administrative ruling.

Because res judicata

does not apply where a court "having jurisdiction, would clearly
have declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion," Watkins,
591 A.2d at 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25
cmt. e), and we conclude this is such a case, we cannot sustain
the district court's dismissal of Jones's complaint on that
ground.

Of course, we intimate no view as to whether there is

any other facial defect in the pleading, as that issue was not
considered by the district court.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment
dismissing Jones's complaint and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs.
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